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Let us begin with a word of appreciation. It is not at all common today that someone
takes the time to comment extensively on an entire special issue – as a collection
and as individual pieces. Thus we very much appreciate Robert Prus’ commentary, his
constructive criticisms and indeed his helpful suggestions. We learned a lot from this close
reading of our efforts. It is fitting that his commentary produces a kind of comparability
between our individual contributions that we had not appreciated before and we are
delighted to be given an opportunity to reply and further specify our argument.
We share with Prus the conviction that ethnographic methods have an important role
to play in comparative studies. Many scholars take a similar view. Yet a broad debate
persists in sociology and cultural anthropology alike as to the exact nature of these
ethnographic contributions. By way of responding on three main points and clarifying
our position, we aim to further this debate.
Ethnography in Social Inquiry
We generally agree with Prus’ introductory point that positivist social science does not
provide “sustained examinations of the ways people purposively (that is, knowingly
and intentionally) enter into ongoing flows of community life as reflective, interacting,
adjustive agents” (page 3). We agree that much positivist and objectivist research
abstains from “what is going on” out there, but we do so in a rather phenomenological
and ethnomethodological fashion. Lived complexities, experiences, and effects have not
played a significant role in quantitative social science work for a number of reasons, which
Prus from a symbolic interactionist perspective rightly emphasizes. We also agree that
the quantitative and qualitative divide reflects a debate still very much alive within social
science communities and indeed our introduction to the special issue makes the same
point although in less depth.
Yet we are somewhat less enthusiastic about an analysis that puts this divide at the
very centre of the debate about how best to understand social order and processes or
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“the whatness of human group life” (page 2). While Prus’ introductory remarks present
an eloquent plea for the purpose, value and rigour of ethnographic inquiry, this plea in its
enthusiasm runs two risks – as an unintended consequence. It runs the risk of stabilising
the quantitative and qualitative divide as a central analytic category in the field. It also
runs the risk of stifling ethnographic creativity, namely by reducing what we perceive as
a plurality of methods into a singular mold fit to answer a preset set of questions deriving
from only one ethnographic tradition. This does not seem to be doing ethnographic
comparisons a favour. To put this simply, not everybody need apply Herbert Blumer’s
wisdom to his or her field of study.
Rather, we should strive towards greater attentiveness to the reasons for and effects of
specific problematizations, research objects, conceptualisations, and field sites and how
they link to questions of methodology. As Kozin points out, the life-world is everything
and nothing; thus it depends on the specific perspective we choose. Only through this
can we discover the life-world’s structure, meaning, and relevance.
Of course, much has been said and written about mixed method approaches, triangula-
tion and the difficulty of bringing quantitative and qualitative analyses together. Few
elegant examples exist that integrate ethnography with quantitative sociological data (cf.
Znaniecki 1965; Cicourel 1973; Wacquant 2009) – or with biological data (cf. Melby et al.
2005). We do not even attempt to delve into the complexity of this debate.
We prefer to isolate a single point that is pertinent to our argument: how comparison
is rendered (im)possible.
Ethnography can produce (in)comparability due to its capability to deal with: uncertain
boundaries, complexity, unsettled matters, and black boxes. Its radical process-orientation
is an undervalued resource when it comes to the business of comparing.
Prus argues that “any approach that does not respect its subject matter is inauthentic”
(page 5). Respect is a term taken from an ethical repertoire which describes a just and
fair relationship between researcher, researched and their respective communities. Few
people in any science would disagree with this. And even fewer would be unable to name
pieces of research that they considered less than respectful in its handling of the research
process and indeed its subject matter.
This seems to be an issue that pertains as much to the social sciences as it does to
natural sciences and medicine. It is equally common in quantitative traditions as in
qualitative traditions. This does not lessen the importance of the issue of respect. It
merely lifts it off the methodological level of analysis. The more fundamental point and
the point that holds the key to making this statement productive is authenticity.
The notion of authenticity is firmly rooted within a representational paradigm. Prus
argues that “because people possess capacities for speech, thought, agency, deliberation,
interaction, and purposive adjustments,” the social sciences require method(ologie)s that
are able to pay respect to these qualities and represent them as authentically as possible.
Quantitative approaches are ill-suited to do so. Qualitative and particularly ethnographic
methods are thus needed.
However, research may focus on other constellations and problematisations, for example
on how settings demand certain modes of participations. Consequently, research may also
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prefer some sets of capacities as compared to others, or certain structures of possibility
that dis/allow people to articulate their thoughts.
Some of us think differently in methodological terms. While most of us do not have
any quarrels with respect, authenticity rests on a troublesome assumption, namely that
something akin to a view from nowhere is still a productive perspective. Prus himself
argues that science is ultimately a social process and product. Taking this seriously means
to us that authenticity is not a category, which should be attributed asymmetrically
to representations by the researcher. Debates on the authenticity of quantitative or
qualitative methods are unlikely to further our analytic capacities.
Rather, we can understand representations as more or less co-productively shaped
through the interaction of researcher and practitioners, author and audience, and indeed
their respective material and symbolic contexts. Representations, comprising their over-
arching circulations, translations, and careers, are not fully controlled by the researcher
(or author) or indeed any single participant in the research endeavor.
What Prus seems to demand is a certain unity of inquiry, both for our group and for
the social sciences as well. Our Special Issue documents a different ethics. We collected
a considerable variety of theoretical and methodological approaches, which temporarily
came together for just one focal project: the quest of ethnographic comparison. This
means that we bring together analytical, participatory, critical, and other ethnographies,
each with different concepts and theoretical assumptions. All of these ethnographies,
however, share a basic idea: in order for ethnography to come back to the business of
comparison it needs to re-articulate the production of comparability and its limits. This
is where the contributors to our special issue meet: not in one theoretical framework but
in a shared interest in reviving ethnographic comparative efforts.
When it comes to ethnography, we celebrate eclecticisms, which must seem rather odd
to Prus who places his own work on solid and traditional grounds. This may suite his
fields of ethnographic inquiry; it does not necessarily suit our fields. Our fields range
from criminal legal procedure, to medical wards, to computer game industry, software
developers, or forensic genetics. Our respect and our authenticity may derive from a
modesty when it comes to the various ways – concepts, theories, frames, methods, styles
of writing etc. – in which it is possible to give voice to these largely diverse fields of
practice and the ethnographic experiences they allow/disallow.
We emphasise in our contributions the importance of producing comparability (dif-
ferently) rather than focusing on (monological) comparison per se. This point is either
undervalued or dismissed in Prus’ comment, due to a different understanding of the
empiricism-theory relation. We place in the foreground the performative aspects of vari-
ous methods, concepts, and perspectives. We appreciate, however, that this performative
turn has not been followed by everyone involved in the field, and for important reasons.
Yet even within a pre-performative epistemological stance, authenticity can only have
ethical, not epistemological, implications. Strathern (2002) reminds us that the problem
with quantitative comparative work has often not been that it tried to objectify and
decontextualize items of information. Rather the problem has been that the operations
run on these items have turned out to be uninteresting. By uninteresting Strathern
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means two things: results are not interested in the objects of study and they do not find
anything unknown beforehand.
Whether our studies are interesting in these two dimensions, we do not know. What we
do know, however, is that ethnography should account for its – conceptual, methodical,
interactional – involvements with the sites and fields of ethnographic research in order to
learn from different experiences (instead of streamlining them). Our special issue is, most
of all, a collection of accounts of contrastive involvements. The articles within it thereby
serve as a backdrop for what we mean by the production of (limited) comparability.
Comparability
The crisis of representation – epitomised in anthropology in the writing-culture debate
of the 1980s – has rippled through all areas of social inquiry. Its implications have
been sustained not only in a few niches of feminist critique, but also in science studies
and some of the more performative readings of sociology and social anthropology. Our
methodological notion of thick comparison is rooted within such lines of thought. And
we thank the editor for giving us the opportunity to further clarify our position.
Thick comparison, as Prus rightly remarks, does indeed borrow from Geertz’s thick
description (Geertz 1973). He argued that a particular action can only be comprehended
with an understanding of the context within which it is situated. Geertz’s example is a
wink of the eye: which can be anything from an erotic advance to some kind of tip-off .
A thick description is a description that not only reports the action itself but also the
context needed to make the action intelligible.
In our re-readings of Geertz’s concept, we find that some researchers emphasise the
situated nature of knowledge and meaning-making practices; others emphasise the
situated character of participation or being/becoming a participant. Situated, and this
goes beyond Geertz, denotes not only a context necessary to understand a particular
action (as the wink in Geertz’s example). It also includes the researcher as well, to whom
things, gestures, speeches, documents, machines and so forth demonstrate their meanings
and relevancies. Situatedness is a notion that reminds us of the collaborative – and
sometimes contested – nature of all meaning-production. We move away from a distant
and representational view of action to a ‘closer’ position of involvement and necessary
partaking.
What are the implications of this for comparative research? Thick comparison trans-
poses the notion of situatedness into comparative settings and emphasises the need to
co-produce comparability. Comparability, like the meaning of Geertz’s wink, is not simply
a given, ready to be represented “from nowhere” – or something that can be read and
re-read like a text and con-text. It does not make itself fully available for our purposes
as an inherent quality of the world or as a preformed thing.
This is even more so the case once we start reframing and modulating components
from different settings. Comparability is constructive and, as a result, a threat to
replace thickness with universal concepts or standards. In top-down analytic approaches,
comparability is produced by selecting a tertium comparationis and adopting this as a
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lens through which to look at two different settings, say, the colour of two objects or the
meaning of a plea-bargain in two different court settings.
We have tried to argue in our special issue that working ethnographically precludes this
kind of comparing for at least two reasons. First, a particular situation or phenomenon
needs to be understood or appropriated in ethnographic terms. The individual contri-
butions show that researchers are not going “into the field” with an a priori notion of
what it is they are going to compare. Ethnographic involvement triggers a co-production
of what is significant in and to a field, what holds it together as a form of practice
and what matters within it. It is only through the involvement that a “field” takes
on the sharp contours that allow us to speak of “field” as if it were a pre-given entity.
Ethnographic involvement is boundary work and integral to the constitution of the objects
of comparison.
Second, and central to the notion of thick comparison and to the entire special issue,
the tertium comparationis, that is, the concepts used to compare, develop through a
process of immersing oneself in two or more different contexts. Researchers’ “toing and
froing” between these contexts spurs at the same time and interactively the delineating
of the field as a distinct social setting and the development and sharpening of concepts
that make sense in both contexts, albeit often in very different ways. If you wish here to
use a term from science studies, you can speak of the co-production of boundary objects.
These are concepts that are relevant in several contexts but are appropriated in very
different ways. Anthropologists tend to use the phrase “play out” in this context, to
mark the dynamic and interactive work that goes into meaning-making.
In thick comparison, then, the tertium comparationis is not derived from theory prior
to the ethnographic research. Rather, it emerges from the ethnographic work together
with an understanding and delineation of the two or more fields within which the research
takes place. This does not by any means open doors for some kind of post-modern
relativism or an a-theoretical empiricist research. It only stresses the processual nature
of ethnographic research.
Hence we are not worried about the limits of comparability. Certain concepts work in
particular contexts and not in others. If we realize during a research process that we
cannot produce comparability, that is, that a concept does not work in two contexts,
then this failure is informative. It does not tell us that our method is flawed or that our
theory is wrong. It makes us think why a concept from one context does not take hold in
another. The limits and failures of our comparative efforts help us to shape each field in
relation to bounded comparison in more clarity.
Contrast versus Reflection
All of this means that we give away some of the control that is needed to achieve the
conceptual clarity Prus is demanding from us. We are not prepared to control comparative
analysis to derive from it trans-situational concepts that add to existing theory. Although
symbolic interactionism is close to most of our hearts, we are separated from it by the
performative turn. We are not in a position to describe thickly and, by doing so, also to
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contribute to a monolithic body of theory.
Th is might be considered a major weakness of our approach. It does not contribute to
existing theory in an additive manner. Rather it hands some of the control over theory
building to the process of research. This has nothing to do with action research, dialogical
anthropology or advocacy. It has everything to do with the position derived from practice-
oriented theories. It responds to the writing-culture debate and the performative turn
that reframes epistemological questions of representation and authenticity as ontic issues
of involvement (Law et al. 1999).
Ours is also a position that emphasises the importance of contrast over critical reflection.
Much of Western social science is built on the idea of critical distance. Going back to
notions of the subject and its possibility to reflect critically, most social-science researchers
have striven to distance themselves from their research subjects and objects. The farther
they remove themselves, the clearer the process of reflection can be. The notion of
transsituationality Prus introduces is a good example of this kind of approach. It is
also an example of how easily ethnographic approaches can be combined with rather
deductive approaches more common in the positivist tradition of social inquiry.
Thick comparison gives up the possibility of critical reflection from a distance and
with a view from nowhere. It allows us to see each field with a new measure, while at
the same time questioning this measure in the light of both fields. We assume, to put it
polemically, that distancing from the subject matter does not make this matter clearer.
It makes the matter harder to decipher without the help of strong theoretical lenses. It is
thus not particularly suited to address problems of meaning-making in different contexts.
We emphasise instead the need for contrasting involvements.
It is not in detached theorizing that we find the opportunity to weigh our subject
matter; it is by comparison and its limits that manage to move in and out the respective
fields. A “toing and froing” between contexts does not produce critical distance. It
instead produces a process of dialogue between general concepts, diverse fields, and
singular involvements. This is at the heart of thick comparison as we see it.
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